To date, the Clinton administration’s China policy had been one of “comprehensive engagement”–but the reality was as muddy as the term. The policy seemed to have been sold into franchises: many different players pursuing competing agendas, with little coordination from above. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown would be striking business deals in China–just when Trade Representative Mickey Kantor was bashing Beijing over intellectual-property issues. Not surprisingly, China got mixed signals, and the absence of predictability bred a lack of trust. Now, stung by the Taiwan crisis, the U.S. team is working toward a “grand bargain” with China, stressing areas of agreement rather than bickering over individual disputes. As Robert Manning of the Progressive Policy Institute says, “We have to accept China as a major power, and they have to take on its responsibilities.”
Setting a new China policy is one thing, but whom will China listen to? Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s dealings with the Chinese have been painful ever since he drew the unenviable assignment of informing Taiwan that Washington was de-recognizing it and establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing in the Carter administration. Christopher was burned again in 1994 when he visited China soon after State’s tough-talking human-rights advocate John Shattuck riled Beijing by meeting with dissident Wei Jingsheng. U.S. China-watchers had high hopes that veteran diplomat Winston Lord, the former U.S. ambassador under Reagan and Bush, had the expertise to mastermind a strategic dialogue. But as assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs, Lord, who participated in the Lake-Liu meeting, has had neither the access to Clinton nor the latitude to be effective.
Lake may have better luck, though he has never been to China, and some analysts say Liu has nowhere near Lake’s clout at home. Beijing speaks with as many discordant voices as Washington does, and it has been recalcitrant on everything from jailing dissidents to violating trade agreements. “Any administration, any policy, would be encountering difficulties with the Chinese at this point,” says Lord. The real question, he argues, is whether China and the U.S. can come up with an agenda of mutual interests broad enough to offset the inevitable points of friction ahead. After all, it’s a rare marriage that succeeds after the “engagement” fails.
