If it happens at all, Desert Storm II would not be a replay of the first conflict. Saddam’s army, battered so badly in 1991, is less than half its former size - though in this ease, smaller also means leaner and better organized. The United States and its allies are far better prepared than they were four years ago, when they were caught napping. This time, U.S. forces and stockpiled military equipment are already on hand in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the waters offshore. If Saddam starts another war, he will lose in the end, and that would probably mean his downfall, But this time, more Americans are in harm’s way.
The first U.S. troops to be deployed in Saudi Arabia in 1990 called themselves “speed bumps.” If Saddam had surged across the Saudi border after conquering Kuwait, the lightly armed American para-troopers and marines would have slowed him but not stopped him. Now the U.S. air, naval and ground forces already deployed in the region can punish the Iraqis, and not just along the Kuwaiti frontier. “We clearly have the capacity to go downtown Baghdad,” Marine Lt. Gen. John Sheehan, the Joint Staff’s operations director, warned last week. But in a frontline defense of Kuwait, American forces probably would pay a steeper price than they did in 1991.
Saddam’s armed forces are again the most formidable in the region. The army was streamlined from 59 divisions to 25, mostly by dropping badly trained reservists and nonmechanized infantry units. The air-defense system has been rebuilt; it is not as sophisticated as the French-designed system knocked out by the allies in 1991, but air force analysts call it “operationally effective.” Iraq’s forces are paper-thin. Many divisions are undermanned, while ammunition and spare parts for the mostly Soviet-made arsenal are in chronically short supply. The Iraqis cannot wage a sustained campaign. To achieve even a limited success on the battlefield–such as seizing Kuwait’s northern oilfields-they would have to strike quickly.
When Washington first detected the Iraqi buildup, its response was carefully calibrated. President Clinton took what he described as “precautionary steps,” ordering the aircraft carrier George Washington and 2,000 marines into the region. Sad-dam’s buildup continued; most ominously, U.S. intelligence detected the presence of Iraqi logistical units, whose support would be vital to any invasion. The U.S. response became more urgent. Clinton dispatched the 4,000-member “ready brigade” of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, which will use M-1A2 tanks already “pre-positioned” in Kuwait, General Sheehan warned that 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles would be within range of Baghdad. And the Western allies already had about 80 combat planes based in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. But few of them were designed for ground attack; the defenders of Kuwait needed tank killers-Apache and Cobra helicopters and Warthog attack planes-and they were not immediately available.
In theory, the Pentagon is prepared to fight two substantial wars at once; the oft-cited paradigm is a simultaneous defense of Kuwait and South Korea (either of which would be a more substantial undertaking than the current occupation of Haiti). Kuwait City and Seoul are both within easy reach of a determined invader. If U.S. forces have to defend Kuwait, they will not be able to trade space for time; the border will become the from line. Close air support will be crucial–and perhaps costly ff Iraq’s mobile air defenses live up to their billing. More U.S. ground forces are available for Kuwait: 16,000 marines from Camp Pendleton. Calff. and the remaining 12,000 members of the 24th Division at Fort Stewart, Ca. They can fly in, but their heavy equipment is aboard pre-positioned cargo ships that won’t reach the northern Persian Gulf until the end of this week.
Eventually, the Iraqis would be dislodged from whatever part of Kuwait they occupied, but the price in American and allied lives might be high. Then again, Sad-dam may not attack at all. If so, the administration will face a different kind of cost. Kuwait will have to be garrisoned for as long as Saddam keeps an invasion-capable force on its doorstep. The cost could be billions of dollars a year-out of a defense budget that is shrinking because, after all, the cold war is over.
Despite U.S. efforts to destroy Sad-dam’s military might, the gulf war left almost half of his armed forces intact.
1990 1994 Active Forces 1,200,000 400,000+ Reservists 650,000 90,000+ ARMY Tanks 5,800 2,100+ Personnel carriers 5,100 2,700+ Artillery pieces 4,000 1,900+ NAVY Warships 5 2 AIR FORCE Bombers 17 6[] Strike aircraft 300 +130[] Fighters 350+ 180[] Attack helicopters 130 120+ MISSILES Scuds (launchers) 22 22 SAMs (launchers) 550+ 600+ [] ESTIMATES. SOURCES: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, IISS.
