The answer is yes: all three of the region’s main flash points—Iraq, Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict—would benefit from bringing the adversaries to the table. Let’s start with Iraq. Washington’s performance there has exacerbated the problems, and Iraq faces many more years of sectarian violence before it has a chance of stability. That said, the United States and the United Kingdom could still help. And as the outside powers bearing the greatest responsibility, they should. How? By promoting a much more intensive round of regional diplomacy aimed at creating a lasting structure for gulf security, with the kind of cooperative mechanisms that brought Eastern and Western Europe together after the end of the cold war.
True, Iraq’s neighbors must make some hard decisions, since the outside powers can’t remain in the country much longer. But London and Washington, with the help of the United Nations, should convene the talks, exert pressure on local states to find a way forward and coordinate international support. It is high time that the U.S. and the U.K. put their weight behind a diplomatic, rather than a military, process.
A similar logic holds on Iran. Tehran’s ambitions will make accommodation complicated. Some of its goals, especially for nuclear weapons, are simply unacceptable. But Iran does have legitimate national and regional interests, and its people have normal economic and social goals that deserve to be met. There is therefore an opportunity to engage the Iranian nation on what it wants for the future. Why set preconditions just for talking, when delay plays into the hands of the hard-liners there (since it gives them more time to build nuclear weapons)?
Engagement also makes sense in the case of Palestine. No solution to this dispute will be possible until the centers of gravity in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion move within touching distance of each other. Given the present animosity, that is a sobering thought. Yet an increasing number of both Israelis and Palestinians are growing exhausted with the violence and the lack of hope for the future.
But let’s be clear about one thing. Engaging the Palestinians means engaging Gaza and Hamas. Fatah has been drained of credibility as a negotiating partner, and no amount of money and attention poured in from North America or Europe will compensate for that. Blair must therefore convince his Western colleagues that sticking to old patterns has become unrealistic. Supporting Fatah just because it recognizes Israel suffers from a fundamental flaw: the movement is corrupt and unelected and has been rejected by the majority of Palestinians. It will never alone represent enough of Palestine to strike a lasting settlement with Israel.
That’s not to suggest it will be easy to work with Hamas, a hard-line group with a history of violence. Hamas refuses to recognize Israel’s statehood as a precondition for negotiations (something the Israelis and Americans have insisted on). But Hamas is a political-grievance-based entity—not an ideological one. This truth has been overlooked in the West. Faced with the prospect that its main grievance—the dispossession of the Palestinian people—could eventually be removed and a viable Palestinian state established, Hamas might finally recognize that no settlement is possible unless Israeli security gets the same priority as justice for the Palestinians. At the very least, this avenue should be properly tested before it is rejected. Direct engagement could leave a bitter taste in many mouths, but it would still be preferable to despair and violence.
As he wades into the process, Blair carries one big advantage: his advice will be listened to in Washington and Jerusalem. The Arab side respects that. But he also has to engage the Palestinian center, which lies closer to Hamas than to Fatah. The current stalemate is not proof that talking doesn’t work. The full power of diplomacy has not been switched on in any of these theaters in the past six years; in that sense, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks got their wish. Now the moment is ripe for talking. How much longer should the peoples of the Middle East—and everyone else with a stake in the region—be expected to wait?
